Tobacco Industry Prevention Programs
“Operation ID School Zone”

In view of the recent deterioration of the tobacco industry’s reputation
worldwide, tobacco multinationals have increased their efforts to create for
themselves a more positive image.

Their “youth prevention programs” are a major component of this offensive.
The industry uses them, among others things, to refute accusations regarding
their efforts to recruit young people and to prevent additional controls on
their marketing activities.

Nonetheless, the tobacco industry’s interests are in complete conflict with
any purported desire to reduce youth smoking: its profitability — indeed,
its very survival — depends on smoking uptake by youths. This is a matter of
economic necessity for the industry: the vast majority of smokers (90%)
start before the age of 18.

If the tobacco industry were truly serious about reducing youth smoking, it
would stop promoting cigarettes through celebrities and activities that are
popular with young people. It would stop opposing effective measures such as
tax hikes, smoking restrictions and a ban on tobacco sponsorship. And it
would stop denying the full effects of smoking and second-hand smoke on
health.

And if the tobacco industry really wanted to prevent tobacco sales to
minors, it would penalize offending retailers by prohibiting them from
selling their cigarettes.

Instead, the tobacco industry launches programs such as “Operation ID School
Zone”. This campaign is designed and funded by the Canadian Tobacco
Manufacturers’ Council and distributed through the Canadian Coalition for
Responsible Tobacco Retailing, whose members include tobacco wholesalers,
retailers and distributors. The main component of this campaign consists of
the distribution of posters, pamphlets and stickers to stores that sell
tobacco. Sometimes the campaign takes on a wider approach by reaching out to
community groups and leaders in order to obtain their endorsement (as it has
done in the regions of Chicoutimi and Jonquière).

1) The tobacco industry runs similar programs all around the world.

In 1982, the U.S. Tobacco Institute (American counterpart of the Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers Council) stated that implementing a “positive program”
to meet the “multiple challenges” facing the industry was urgent. According
to a director from Philip Morris: “If we can frame proactive legislation or
other kinds of action on the Youth Access issue … we will be protecting our
industry for decades to come.”

In 1990, the industry launched the program “It’s the Law” (whose main
components are all found in its Canadian counterpart Operation ID). “It’s
the Law” was replaced with much fanfare in 1995 by the program “We Card” and
is distributed by the leading American tobacco manufacturers as well as the
Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing.

Youth access programs dominate the youth prevention initiatives of British
American Tobacco (owner of Imperial Tobacco) with 15 projects in about a
dozen countries, as well as those of Philip Morris, who is participating in
no less than 57 youth access prevention programs .

2) The true objectives of these programs are very different from what the
industry publicly claims.

Tobacco manufacturers use their youth access programs as “evidence” that
they are opposed to youth smoking, that they are responsible corporate
citizens, and that they don’t need additional controls from governments.

However, internal tobacco industry documents clearly state the real
objectives of youth access programs. For example, a memo from Philip Morris
reads:
“As we discussed, the ultimate means for determining the success of this
program will be:
1) A reduction in legislation introduced and passed restricting or banning
our sales and marketing activities;
2) Passage of legislation favorable to the industry;
3) Greater support from business, parent, and teacher groups.”

The goal, therefore, is not to reduce tobacco use, but to prevent
legislative measures that could hinder the industry’s marketing efforts
aimed at young people!

3) Operation ID is nothing but a public relations exercise.

These programs help the industry counter its bad reputation by creating the
false impression that it cares about young people’s health and by
associating itself with respectable community organizations. Accordingly,
the large array of public relations activities promoting Operation ID draws
attention away from the fact that the industry is carrying on with its
marketing efforts aimed at teenagers, that it is being prosecuted for its
involvement in cigarette smuggling, that it denies the health effects of
second-hand smoke, that it manipulates nicotine levels in cigarettes to
increase addiction… and the list goes on.

When one considers the results of the program’s implementation in Chicoutimi
and Jonquière, one can see that it has generated lots of great publicity for
itself, the industry and retailers. But if one considers the program’s
impact on compliance or on youth smoking rates, it is an abysmal failure.

4) Retailer education programs do not work.

Independent scientific studies show that retailers’ education programs have
no measurable impact on tobacco sales to minors . The effects are temporary
at best. It is no wonder when one considers that these programs focus on
education, that participation is voluntary, and that there is no inspection
system or penalties to reprimand offenders.

Since the program’s launching in Chicoutimi and Jonquière at the community
level in September 2000, Operation ID School Zone has, in fact, been
associated with a decrease in compliance—in spite of the fact that 93% of
retailers participate in the program. According to Health Canada, the number
of retailers selling cigarettes to minors jumped from 28% (summer 1999) to
36% (winter 2000-2001) .

We must not kid ourselves. Retailers are commercial businesses whose goal it
is to make money. In Quebec, cigarette sales to minors represent eight
million dollars in annual profits for retailers. Without appropriate
economic incentives to counter this income (i.e. substantial and systematic
financial penalties), sales to minors will continue.

5) Banning cigarette sales to minors in and of itself has little effect on
youth smoking rates.

There is a good reason why the industry choose to focus on limiting access
to tobacco in its public relations campaign: it is one of the most
ineffective measures to fight against youth smoking. (Reducing tobacco sales
to minors by retailers is very different from reducing tobacco use by young
people.) The measure addresses only the source of where teenagers get their
cigarettes. It doesn’t in any way address young people’s desire to smoke.
The industry knows that if kids want to smoke, they can easily get around
the law by finding one corner store that sells to minors, by asking a
passing stranger, friend or an older sibling to purchase cigarettes for
them, or by getting false ID. Experts in health promotion say that to have a
real impact on smoking rates amongst youth, compliance has to reach at least
90% - a compliance rate that doesn’t exist in any Canadian city. Others
concluded that any impact of laws prohibiting sales to minors is likely to
be small .

6) Operation ID helps the industry avoid truly effective measures.

When Canadian industry associations and retailers discuss youth smoking,
they inevitably advocate reducing access—by raising retailer awareness
through Operation ID. No other measure, such as raising cigarette prices or
banning tobacco promotion, is put forward as a way to tackle youth smoking.

Operation ID also assists retailers in condemning punitive measures (such as
fines) aimed at those who are found guilty of illegal sales to minors. Yet
storekeepers have known since 1994 that selling cigarettes to minors is
prohibited. How many more years of “awareness-raising” do they need before
they should be subject to the law like everybody else?

7) Operation ID monopolizes the time and support of community leaders and
organizations
around a useless initiative.

In Chicoutimi and Jonquière, dozens of community leaders and organizations
have lent their support to the program, including the cities, police
departments and boards of trade of Jonquière and Chicoutimi. Their
endorsement is no doubt based on genuine concern for young people’s health
but the fact is, their support benefits none other than the tobacco
industry.

Aside from the ineffectiveness of the campaign in reducing youth smoking,
Operation ID gives participating members a false sense of accomplishment, in
that they think they are contributing to the fight against youth smoking
when in reality they are not.

Paid advertisements of ‘open letters’ enumerating program partners and
sending useless messages like “let retailers know you support them” do not
serve any other purpose except to make supporters feel good about their
support and to distract everyone’s attention from other more effective and
essential tobacco control measures.

8) Operation ID increases the appeal of smoking to teenagers.

In addition to being ineffective, the message delivered by such
programs—namely that “kids shouldn’t smoke”—reinforces the industry’s
marketing efforts which position tobacco as a forbidden fruit and as a badge
of maturity. (It is important to distinguish between ‘objectives’ and
‘messages’. While we may agree with the objective that teenagers shouldn’t
smoke, it does not follow that this is the appropriate message to send to
teenagers to try to bring it about. )

A Philip Morris International document states:
“… we refined the objective of a juvenile initiative program as follows:
“Maintain and proactively protect our ability to advertise, promote and
market our products via a … series of programs and events to discourage
juvenile smoking because smoking is an adult decision.” [Emphasis added]

Young people’s attraction to smoking lies precisely in this “adult” image
created through industry marketing. As an internal industry document states:
“In the young smoker's mind, a cigarette falls into the same category with
wine, beer, … declaration of independence and striving for
self-identity.... Thus, an attempt to reach young smokers, starters, should
be based, among others, on the following major parameters: [1] Present the
cigarette as one of the few initiations into the adult world.” [Emphasis
added]

In fact, the posters, stickers and flyers of Operation ID (and similar
programs) virtually scream that smoking is for adults only.

(Take a close look at the posters: they are usually addressed to minors, not
to retailers.)

There is no mention of negative health effects from smoking nor of nicotine
addiction...

So the message is not that smoking is bad, but rather that smoking is
acceptable – even desirable– as long as one is an adult, and that teenagers
have to wait until they are 18 before they can light up. Can one imagine a
better way of catering to young people’s desire to be like adults?

The choice of partners for Operation ID is also strategic. Parents,
teachers, politicians and other authority figures are precisely those
against which teenagers rebel. An internal Philip Morris document regarding
its youth programs explains: “We are also working with parent and teacher
organizations to ensure that minors receive support and education in regard
to smoking being an adult practice.” [Emphasis added]

But when it really counts, the industry uses attractive models and sports
celebrities like racecar driver Jacques Villeneuve… to advertise its
cigarettes!

9) Quebec health groups oppose the “Operation ID” program.

The following tobacco control groups have called for a boycott of Operation
ID School Zone:

§ the Quebec Coalition for Tobacco Control;
§ the Quebec Lung Association;
§ the Quebec Public Health Association;
§ the Non-Smokers’ Rights Association (Quebec Office);
§ the Quebec Council on Tobacco and Health;
§ the Canadian Cancer Society (Quebec Division).